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Where the Rainbow Ends: Trying to Find a Pot of
Gold for Same-Sex Couples in Pennsylvania
Maureen B. Cohon1
I. INTRODUCTION
By all accounts, Carole and Barb and their twin boys, Reese and
Robbie, are a regular family. The four of them live in Lancaster,
Pennsylvania, along with George, the family Chihuahua. 2 Barb,
the breadwinner, works for a local phone company, and Carole is a
stay-at-home mom.3 The boys call Carole and Barb, Mama and
Mimi, respectively.! They watch Disney movies together, go to
church on Sundays, and, for the boys' fourth birthday, their moms
threw a ladybug-themed party in their backyard.5
This family, a typical family in all respects but one, recently
moved one step closer to finding their pot of gold at the end of the
rainbow. In August, 2002, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled
unanimously that the Pennsylvania Adoption Act allowed a les-
bian or gay partner to adopt the other partner's children without
requiring the termination of the partner's parental rights.6 With
this ruling, gay and lesbian couples moved another step closer to
full acceptance under Pennsylvania law. However, as one obstacle
to legal acceptance fell by the wayside, still others remain.
As same-sex couples continue to search for full rights, it is use-
ful to look at the current status of the law regarding gay and les-
bian couples. This article surveys the current landscape of family
law in Pennsylvania as it relates to gays and lesbians and their
1. Maureen B. Cohon is counsel to the law firm of Buchanan Ingersoll. She is a mem-
ber of the firm's Family Law Section and serves as chair of the firm's Non-traditional Cou-
ples and Families Practice Group. I am grateful to Stefanie Doebler, who was a summer
associate at Buchanan Ingersoll, for her help in developing and researching this article. I
am also grateful to Kerri Coriston, an associate at Buchanan Ingersoll, for her help in re-
searching and refining this article.





6. In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002); See also Mackenzie
Carter, Ruling Benefits Gays' Children, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, August 22, 2002, at B-
1, available at 2002 WL 21895372.
495
496 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 41
families. Many of the issues presented in the article have not yet
been litigated in Pennsylvania or have been dealt with only super-
ficially, so it remains uncertain how the courts will rule when they
are ultimately faced with these issues.
II. SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS AND MARRIAGE
Pennsylvania law defines "marriage" as a "civil contract by
which one man and one woman take each other for husband and
wife."7 Accordingly, Pennsylvania, like the other 49 states and
Washington, D.C., does not recognize same-sex marriages and
therefore does not afford any of the benefits of marriage to same-
sex couples.8  As a result, gay and lesbian couples have been
forced to seek legal recognition of their relationships through
other channels.9
A. Civil Unions
Although no state recognizes same-sex marriage,' ° same-sex
couples in Vermont can receive many of the rights and responsi-
bilities of marriage by entering into a civil union." These unions,
however, are generally not recognized outside of Vermont,12 and if
7. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 1102 (West 2001).
8. De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); For a discussion of fed-
eral marriage rights, see generally David Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of
Marriage and Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 47 (1996).
9. According to an Associated Press report published in the Wall Street Journal, "na-
tionally, households comprised of unmarried partner homes, regardless of sexual orienta-
tion, rose 72 %, from 3.2 million in 1990 to 5.5 million in 2000." Same Sex Partner Home
Jump in Census Figures, WALL ST. J., June 14, 2001, at A10.
10. The Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. Co. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 1
U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. V 1999) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. IV 1998)), allows states to refuse to
give full faith and credit to same-sex marriages performed in another state. Thus, even if a
state were to allow for gay marriages, the marriage would be invalid in any other state.
11. So far the closest any state has come to legalizing same-sex marriage is the Ver-
mont Civil Union Law, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a) (Supp. 2000). After signing the bill,
Vermont Governor Howard Dean stated: "I believe it speaks to the notion.. .that all people
are created equal and that no one group of Vermonters will get more benefits or fewer bene-
fits than any other group of Vermonters." Adam Lisberg, Dean Signs Civil Unions Into
Law, THE BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, April 27, 2000, at 1A. See also Greg Johnson, Vermont
Civil Unions: The New Language of Marriage, 25 VT. L. REV. 15, 15 (2000). The statute
grants same-sex couples all of the benefits granted to spouses in marriage, including the
right to inherit from each other, adopt a child, participate in spouse abuse programs, and at
least twenty other enumerated rights. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204.
12. Closely following the Vermont Civil Union Law, Hawaii enacted the Hawaii Recip-
rocal Benefits Law. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C. Falling short of the rights afforded under a
civil union law, the statute provides certain benefits to same-sex partners. Specifically, the
law defines "reciprocal beneficiaries" as any two persons, 18 or older, not married or in
another reciprocal beneficiaries' relationship, legally prohibited from getting married, who
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one lives outside of Vermont it may be difficult to dissolve a civil
union because Vermont has a one-year residency requirement. 3
Specifically, Pennsylvania law provides that a "marriage between
persons of the same sex which was entered into in another state or
foreign jurisdiction, even if valid where entered into, shall be void
in this Commonwealth."14 The conundrum, of course, is that civil
unions are distinct from marriage and therefore are not techni-
cally governed by Pennsylvania or federal law."6 Proponents of
civil unions have advocated that such relationships should be rec-
ognized under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United
States Constitution,16 but the strength of that proposition has only
recently been tested. 7
B. Domestic Partnership Agreements
In the absence of the ability to marry or enter into civil unions,
many gay and lesbian couples have sought recognition as domestic
partners. 8  Domestic partners are unmarried couples (same- or
have declared themselves to be in such a relationship. HAW. REV. STAT. § 574C-4. The
benefits the law provides include (1) hospital visitation and medical decision-making, (2)
the right to bring a wrongful death action, (3) intestate inheritance rights, and (4) the abil-
ity to hold property as tenants by the entirety. See contra W. Brian Burnette, Note, Ha-
waii's Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act: An Effective Step in Resolving the Controversy Sur-
rounding Same-Sex Marriage, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 81, 87-88 (1998) (while arguing that this
legislation was the only "viable alternative" available to lesbian and gay couples following
the constitutional amendment in Hawaii restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples, Bur-
nette notes that this bill only includes three of the fourteen rights and benefits enjoyed by
married couples but denied to same-sex couples under Hawaii law, as listed by the Hawaii
Supreme Court in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993)).
13. See Fred A. Bernstein, Gay Unions Were Only Half the Battle, N.Y. TIMES, April 6,
2003, available at 2003 WL 18101406.
14. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 1704 (West 2003).
15. Vermont law defines "marriage" as "the legally recognized union of one man and
one woman," whereas a "civil union" occurs when "two eligible persons have established a
relationship pursuant to this chapter, and may receive the benefits and protections and be
subject to the responsibilities of spouses." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (Supp. 2000).
16. Lewis A. Silverman, Vermont Civil Unions, Full Faith and Credit, and Marital
Status, 89 KY. L.J. 1075, 1096-1102 (2001). The Full Faith and Credit Clause states: "Full
Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial pro-
ceedings of every other State. And the Congress may prescribe the Manner in which such
Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 1.
17. A lesbian mother whose visitation rights with her children are premised on the
absence of the non-marital partner in her home wants a court to declare that her civil un-
ion partner's residence with her will not effect her visitation rights. See Rebecca McCarthy,
Vermont's Gay Union Law Faces Georgia Test, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, April 26, 2001, at
Al.
18. See generally William C. Duncan, Domestic Partnership Laws in the United States:
A Review and Critique, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 961 (2001). See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Domestic
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opposite-sex) who live together and seek the economic and non-
economic benefits granted their married counterparts. 9 Many
municipalities allow same-sex couples to register their relation-
ships.2" Registering can serve as proof of domestic partnership
status for couples who wish to receive benefits from a private em-
ployer, and domestic partnership registration can be structured to
include those rights that are most relevant to unmarried cohabi-
tants.
Other couples choose to formalize their relationships by execut-
ing written partnership agreements, such as domestic partnership
agreements or cohabitation agreements. These agreements can
clearly document for a court and all other interested parties the
"family nature" of the cohabiting parties' relationship and living
arrangements." They may define the partners' financial obliga-
tions to one another and to their children, clarify the ownership of
major assets such as real or personal property, and protect the
partners' rights should they ever terminate their relationship.22 In
the event of a separation, a domestic partnership agreement could
save the parties the time and expense of litigating their rights and
obligations, particularly with respect to property.23 It may also
prescribe alternative dispute resolution for issues concerning en-
forcement of provisions contained within the agreement.24
Pennsylvania courts have yet to evaluate whether such agree-
ments are enforceable, but courts in other jurisdictions have held
that these types of agreements can create an enforceable contract
between same-sex partners.25 A Florida appellate court noted that
"even though the state has prohibited same-sex marriages and
Partnership, Civil Unions, or Marriage: One Size Does Not Fit All, 64 ALB. L. REV. 905, 911
(2001); Charles R.P. Pouncy, Marriage and Domestic Partnership: Rationality and Inequal-
ity, 7 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 363, 377 (1998).
19. HAYDEN CURRY et al., A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND GAY COUPLES 1/7 (10th ed.
1999).
20. Cities such as New York, San Francisco, Denver, and Tacoma Park have domestic
partner laws, Daniel F. Drummond, Give Metro Benefits to Gays, WASH. TIMES, Oct., 13,
2000, at C1.
21. Brooke Oliver, Contract for Cohabitation: Adapting the California Statutory Mari-
tal Contract to Life Partnership Agreements Between Lesbian, Gay or Unmarried Heterosex-
ual Couples, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 899,904 (1993).
22. E. Todd Bennett & James D. Milko, Gay and Lesbian Rights in Family Law: A
Demographic Inevitability, 35 MD. B.J. 24, 28 (2002).
23. Mary L. Bonauto, Advising Non-Traditional Families: A General Introduction, 40
BOSTON BAR J. 10 (1996).
24. Id.
25. Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Cal. App. Ct. 1988); Posik v. Layton,
695 So.2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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same-sex adoptions, it has not prohibited this type of agreement."26
To be valid, domestic partner and cohabitation agreements must
be in writing and they must make clear that the delivery of and
payment for sexual services was not the primarily reason for the
27agreement.
Even if a domestic partner or cohabitation agreement cannot
stand up in a court of law, the agreement may be written evidence
of the parties' intent to determine their rights and interests with
respect to their jointly and separately owned real estate and other
property. If necessary, a same-sex couple or surviving partner
could use the agreement to demonstrate their familial status in a
court proceeding.8
C. Adult Adoption
Another, albeit less frequent, way for same-sex couples to create
a legally recognized relationship is through an adult adoption,
whereby one partner adopts the other.29 Unlike other states,
which bar adult adoptions or specify a minimum age difference
between the adoptive parent and child, in Pennsylvania, any indi-
30vidual may be adopted regardless of his age or residence. Al-
though Pennsylvania courts have not been called upon to interpret
whether the adoption statutes permit this type of adoption, courts
in other states have interpreted similar statutes to allow for adult
adoptions. In two New York cases and one Delaware case, courts
have allowed gay men to adopt their partners to facilitate estate
26. Posik, 695 So.2d at 761.
27. Id. at 762.
28. Oliver, supra note 21, at 905.
29. See In re the Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d 1095, 1099 (Del. 1993); Rickard v.
McKesson, 774 So. 2d 838, 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., 2000) (gay adult adoption subsequently
challenged in inheritance dispute between surviving adopted partner and blood relatives);
Phuong Ly, Gay Man Makes Legal Tie, Adopts His Partner, WASH. POST, May 26, 2001, at
B2 (where Montgomery County (Md) Circuit Judge DeLawrence Beard had approved a
petition by a gay man to adopt his same-sex partner of 32 years in order to establish a legal
family relationship, mainly for purposes of inheritance and being able to make legally en-
forceable decisions about each other's medical care. The attorney for the two men, who
wished to remain anonymous, stated that they were a middle-aged couple, and that the
younger man had adopted the older one, whose parents are deceased and thus could not
object. The order approving the adoption requires that a new birth certificate be issued to
the older man, listing the younger man as his parent.) C.f. Matter of Adoption of Robert
Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424 (N.Y. 1984) (finding that New York's adoption law was intended to
imitate nature, thus precluding its use for an adoption where a sexual relationship rather
than a parent-and-child relationship was contemplated between the parties).
30. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2311 (West 2001).
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planning and to obtain suitable housing.31 In another case, how-
ever, the New York Court of Appeals held that a 57-year-old man
could not adopt his 50-year-old partner because the purpose of the
adoption statute was to legalize the relationship of parent and
child, not to provide a means to evade existing inheritance laws.32
Not surprisingly, there are significant disadvantages to such an
arrangement. First, although sodomy is no longer illegal in Penn-
sylvania, a sexual relationship between a parent and child is con-
sidered incest under Pennsylvania law.33 Second, once a parent-
child relationship is formalized through adoption, it cannot be re-
scinded if the partners later decide that they want to dissolve
their relationship.34 Finally, the rights of the adoptee's biological
parents must terminate when he or she is adopted," which could
not only be destructive to that relationship but which also severs
"the adoptee's right to inherit from his or her biological parents" or
relatives.
III. ADOPTION AND PARENTING
Adoption presents two types of issues. First, may gays and les-
bians adopt children that are not biologically related to either pro-
spective parent? Second, are "second-parent" adoptions permit-
ted?36 Pennsylvania's statutory scheme, like that of most states,
does not specifically address either issue.37 As a result, the ability
31. In re Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1993); In re Adoption of Adult
Anonymous II, 452 N.Y.S.2d 198 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982); In re Adoption of Adult Anonymous,
106 Misc. 2d 792 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981).
32. In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424 (N.Y. 1984).
33. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4302 (West 1983) ("A person is guilty of incest, a felony of
the second degree, if that person knowingly marries or cohabits or has sexual intercourse
with an ancestor or descendant, a brother or sister of the whole or half blood or an uncle,
aunt, nephew or niece of the whole blood. The relationships referred to in this section in-
clude blood relationships without regard to legitimacy, and relationship of parent and child
by adoption.").
34. See Lisa R. Zimmer, Family, Marriage, and the Same-Sex Couple, 12 CARDOZO L.
REV. 681, 692 (1990); Gwendolyn L. Snodgrass, Creating Family Without Marriage: The
Advantages and Disadvantages of Adult Adoptions Among Gay and Lesbian Partners, 36
BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 75, 83-84 (1997); Rebecca Lynn C. v. Michael Joseph B., 2002 W.VA.
LEXIS 201, at * 30 (Albright, J. dissenting).
35. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2901 (West 2001).
36. For reviews of the literature on gay and lesbian parenthood, see Cheryl A. Parks,
Lesbian Parenthood: A Review of the Literature, 68 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 376-89 (1998);
Charlotte Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents, 19 ADVANCES IN CLINICAL
CHILD PSYCHOL. 235-82 (1997).
37. 23 PA. C.S. § 2901. See e.g. Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One
Legal Stranger: Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L.
REV. 341, 347 (2002).
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of gay and lesbian people to adopt children is entirely dependant
on judicial interpretation.38
A. Pennsylvania Adoption Law
In Pennsylvania, a child that is not the biological child of one
partner can be legally adopted by both partners in a same-sex re-
lationship.39 The Pennsylvania Adoption Act provides that "any
individual" can adopt." Given the discretion that individual
judges possess, absent a specific provision forbidding such adop-
tions, a child can be adopted by two same-sex individuals.4'
Until recently, however, "second-parent" adoptions in a same-
sex relationship (an adoption of children by the same-sex partner
of a biological parent without terminating the parental rights of
the biological parent) were forbidden. In a landmark ruling, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in August of 2002, interpreted the
Pennsylvania Adoption Act to allow for same-sex second-parent
adoptions given a showing of cause by the adopting-parent.
2
The decision reversed two earlier Pennsylvania Superior Court
rulings that had interpreted the Pennsylvania Adoption Act to bar
38. Historically, the courts have been slow to respond to the changing composition of
families. Embracing the values associated with the traditional nuclear family, family law
has been reluctant to stray from that traditional model. For example, the courts did not
recognize the constitutional rights of unwed fathers until 1972 when the U.S. Supreme
Court decided Stanley v. Illinois. Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About
Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. REV. 637, 647 (1993). Dolgin noted that the Supreme Court recog-
nized the constitutional rights of unwed fathers in their relationships with their children
for the first time in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). The case extended constitu-
tional protection to an unwed father who had lived with his children and their mother
sporadically for eighteen years. The mother died, and due to the presumption that unwed
fathers were unfit, Illinois law required the state to take custody of the children. The Court
noted that the father was a member of a family unit, consisting of himself, the mother, and
the children, and determined that the statute deprived the father of due process and equal
protection by not allowing him a hearing.
39. In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F, 803 A.2d 1195, 1202 (Pa. 2002).
40. 23 PA. C.S. § 2901.
41. "There is no language in the Adoption Act precluding two unmarried same-sex
partners (or unmarried heterosexual partners) from adopting a child who had no legal
parents." In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F, 803 A.2d 1195, 1202 (Pa. 2002). Nothing in
the law prevented a homosexual couple from jointly adopting a child, but if one member of
a partnership already was a parent, the other partner could not adopt. Thus, many couples
considered first terminating one partner's parental rights so that both partners could adopt
the child together. However, the thought of terminating parental rights to one's child was
obviously frightening. As one parent stated prior to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rul-
ing allowing second parent adoptions, "Do you even for half a second want to give up paren-
tal rights and chance the state sweeping in and taking her?" Kathy Boccella, A Court Rul-
ing Now Allows Gay Couples in Pennsylvania to be Just That, THE PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Sept. 4, 2002, at El.
42. In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d at 1202.
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same-sex second-parent adoptions across the board. " The Act it-
self does not place any restrictions on who may adopt a child," but
it does say that, unless the court determines otherwise, a final
decree of adoption may not be entered unless the natural parent
or parents' rights have been terminated.45 The only exception to
this rule is that a parent does not have to relinquish his or her
rights when consenting to the adoption of his or her child by a
spouse, known as a second-parent adoption. 6 In 1982, the Act was
amended to allow a trial court, "upon cause shown," to waive any
statutory requirement, including ostensibly the termination of
parental rights requirement.
47
Two different Pennsylvania Superior Court rulings had inter-
preted these provisions to mean that only couples in legally recog-
nized marital relationships could obtain second-parent adoptions.
In two nearly identical 6-3 rulings, In re Adoption of C.C.G and
Z.C.G. and In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., the superior court
held that people in same-sex relationships cannot adopt their
partners' children because they do not qualify as spouses as re-
quired by the Adoption Act.48 Moreover, the superior court noted
that the legally recognized parents had not terminated their pa-
rental rights pursuant to section 2711(d), noting that "the clear
and unambiguous provisions of the Adoption Act do not permit a
non-spouse to adopt a child where the legal parents have not re-
linquished their respective parental rights."9 Regarding the
"cause shown" language, the court narrowly interpreted the dis-
43. See In re Adoption of C.C.G and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d 724 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000); In re
Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d 739 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). Previous to the two
Superior Court decisions, Pennsylvania took a patchwork approach to second-parent adop-
tions. For instance, Allegheny County allowed second parent adoptions, while Montgomery
County did not.
44. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2312 (West 2003) ("Any individual may become an adopt-
ing parent.") (emphasis added).
45. § 2901.
46. § 2903. There are three types of adoption: (1) second-parent adoption, (2) agency
adoption, and (3) private placement adoption. Second-parent same-sex adoptions occur
when a lesbian or gay man legally adopts the biological or adoptive children of his or her
parent as might a stepmother or stepfather in a heterosexual family. Agency adoptions
refer to the adoption of a child through a state child welfare agency, whereas private
placement adoptions refer to the adoption of a child through a private agency or consensual
arrangements between private parties. LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND,
ADOPTION BY LESBIANS AND GAY MEN: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LAW IN THE 50 STATES 1
(1996).
47. 23 PA.CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2901 (2001).
48. In re Adoption of C.C.G and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d 724 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000); In re Adop-
tion of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d 739 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
49. C.C.G. and Z.C.G., 762 A.2d at 728; R.B.F. and R.C.F., 762 A.2d at 742.
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cretion given to the trial court, ultimately finding that "the best
interests of the child" was not an appropriate consideration and
consequently appellants had failed to demonstrate cause. °
The superior court decisions were appealed to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court which, in a unanimous opinion, held that the
Pennsylvania Adoption Act permitted a gay or lesbian partner to
adopt his or her partner's child.5 As to the findings of the superior
court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed that same-sex
partners were not "spouses" under Pennsylvania law, and that a
legal parent must relinquish his or her parental rights to consent
to the adoption of a child by a non-spouse. 2 However, in ulti-
mately deciding for the appellants, the court stated 'a]fter careful
consideration, we agree with the appellants that there is no rea-
sonable construction of the Section 2901 'cause shown' language
other than to conclude that it permits a petitioner to demonstrate
why, in a particular case, he or she cannot meet the statutory re-
quirements."53 A gay or lesbian couple, therefore, is permitted to
demonstrate why they are unable to meet the statutory require-
ment and, upon a finding of cause, a court has discretion to grant
an adoption petition if it is in the best interest of the child. '
The decision in In Re R.B.F. and R.C.F. extends a variety of po-
tential legal benefits to children in same-sex households.5 An ad-
judication of legal parentage entitles a child to receive child sup-
port, qualify as a dependant on a parent's health insurance plan,
collect Social Security benefits from a parent, sustain an action for
wrongful death, recover under a state's workers compensation
law, and inherit from a parent." Finally, it gives the adopting
parent the right to make medical and education decisions for the
adopted child. 7
B. Co-Parenting Agreements
Because it is too early to fully realize the practical result of the
courts decision to allow same-sex adoptions, a co-parenting
50. Id.
51. In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F, 803 A.2d 1195, 1202 (Pa. 2002).
52. Id. at 1199.
53. Id. at 1202 (Pa. 2002).
54. Id. at 1202-03.
55. See L. Stuart Ditzen, Pa. Court Ends Ban on Gay Adoptions, PHILADELPHIA





agreement, signed by both the legal and non-legal parent of the
child, may still be a desirable option to secure full parentage re-
sponsibilities.58 The purpose of these agreements is to clearly set
forth the rights and responsibilities of each parent. Although
their validity has never been explicitly litigated in Pennsylvania,
dicta in several cases suggest that Pennsylvania courts would find
such agreements to be unenforceable. For example, in one case,
the trial court noted that "even had the parties entered into the
'co-parenting' contract, it would have been void as against the
weight of the law and the public policy of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania."59 The decision was reversed on appeal because the
court found that the appellant stood in loco parentis to the child
and therefore had standing to petition for custody," but the appel-
late court noted that the parties had not signed a co-parenting
agreement because their attorneys had advised them that they
were not enforceable in Pennsylvania.61
C. Standby Guardianship
Parents, particularly those with life-threatening illnesses, may
use the Standby Guardianship Act to designate a standby guard-
ian, whose authority to act on behalf of the parent takes effect fol-
lowing the occurrence of some specified triggering event, such as
when the parent is incapacitated, dies, or is otherwise unable to
care for his or her child.6" If the triggering event is the death of
the parent, the designated standby guardian may also be ap-
pointed as the children's permanent guardian if the parent indi-
cates such a desire in the document designating the standby
guardian."
Designations of standby guardians must be in writing and are
not valid if the minor has another living parent whose where-
abouts are known and who is willing and able to raise the child.64
58. Co-parenting agreements have continued significance because the R.B.F. decision
leaves a substantial amount of discretion to judges, therefore, various counties may impose
burdensome procedures and long delays to sidetrack second-parent adoptions. Moreover,
some courts have indicated that that they want a substantial amount of evidence and wit-
nesses as proof that the adoption is in the child's best interests. Meeting of the Pennsyl-
vania Council for Second-Parent Adoption, Sept. 27, 2002.
59. J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 31 Phila. Co. Rptr. 528, 532 n.2 (Pa. Com. P1. 1985).
60. J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1316 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
61. Id. at 1317.
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IV. CHILD CUSTODY AND SUPPORT
Although most of the controversy surrounding gay and lesbian
relationships deals with defining and protecting long-term com-
mitments, the issue of what happens when these relationships end
is equally important. 5 Because lesbian and gay couples cannot
marry, they cannot divorce. Custody and support of the their
children is nevertheless an issue.
A. Dissolution of a Same-Sex Marriage
In the 2001 case of T.B. v. L.R.M., the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court determined that a former same-sex partner could use the
doctrine of in loco parentis to gain standing when seeking partial
custody for purposes of visitation." This doctrine recognizes that
a person who has performed the duties and acquired the status of
a parent has a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the
custody of the child he or she has parented and that severing
those relationships inflicts severe distress and lasting harm on
children.67 The rights and liabilities arising out of an in loco par-
entis relationship are exactly the same as between a biological or
adoptive parent and child.66
. In T.B. v. L.R.M., two women in an exclusive relationship de-
cided to have a child and L.R.M. became pregnant and gave
birth.69  Although they did not enter into a formal parenting
agreement, the three lived together as a family unit with T.B. as-
suming the role of co-parent. ' ° When the child was three, T.B.
ended her relationship with L.R.M. and filed for shared legal and
partial custody and visitation.71 The court noted that in loco par-
entis status refers to a person who assumes the obligations inci-
dent to parenthood without going through the formal adoption
process. 2 The fact that T.B. could not marry the child's biological
65. See generally, Julie Shapiro, Custody and Conduct: How the Law Fails Lesbian and
Gay Parents and Their Children, 71 IND. L.J. 623, 632 (1996); see also Lynn D. Wardle,
The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833, 868-
69; Elizabeth Trainor, Annotation, Initial Award or Denial of Child Custody to Homosexual
or Lesbian Parent, 62 A.L.R.5th 591, 600 (1998).
66. 786 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2001).
67. Rosado v. Diaz, 624 A.2d 193 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
68. 786 A.2d at 917.
69. Id. at 915.
70. Id. at 914-15.
71. Id. at 915.
72. Id. at 917.
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mother or legally adopt the child did not interfere with her stand-
ing to seek partial custody for purposes of visitation.73
In a case with similar facts, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
noted that a biological parent's rights "do not extend to erasing a
relationship between her partner and her child which she volun-
tarily created and actively fostered simply because after the par-
ties' separation she regretted having done so."
4
B. Custody of Children from a Previous Marriage or Relationship
A related issue arises when a gay or lesbian parent seeks cus-
tody of children from a previous marriage or other heterosexual
relationship. Occasionally one parent will attempt to use the
other parent's sexual orientation to block him or her from obtain-
ing custody." Although Pennsylvania courts have held that "ho-
mosexuality per se is not a basis for denying visitation or partial
custody to a parent," the parent's sexual orientation is neverthe-
less a factor in the court's decision regarding the best interests of
the child."6 An appellate court noted that there are "significant
social, moral and legal distinctions between the traditional hetero-
sexual family relationship and the illicit homosexual relation-
ship."77 Furthermore, the burden is on the parent who is involved
in the gay or lesbian relationship to prove that the child will not
be harmed if the parent is awarded custody.78 In one case, a court
found that a father's homosexual relationship had an adverse ef-
fect on the emotional well-being of his children and affirmed the
family court's order granting him only limited partial custody of
his children.79 In another case, the court found that there was no
73. T.D., 786 A.2d at 917-18.
74. J.A.L.v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1322 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
75. See, e.g., J.A.D. v. F.J.D., 978 S.W.2d 336, 338-39 (Mo. 1998) (holding that a "homo-
sexual parent is not ipso facto unfit for custody of his or her child" in affirming the trial
court's award of custody to the heterosexual father) (The Missouri Supreme Court further
indicated that no reported Missouri case had ever held that a gay parent was ipso facto
unfit.) But c.f. S.L.H. v. D.B.H., 745 S.W.2d 848, 849 (Mo. Ct. App. 1888) (holding that "[w]e
agree that placing primary custody of a minor child with the non-homosexual parent is in
the best interests of the child" in awarding custody to the mother who had denied the ru-
mor of being a lesbian)); Pulliam v. Smith, 501 S.E.2d 898, 904 (N.C. 1998) (holding that
"the mere homosexual status of a parent is [not] sufficient, taken alone, to support denying
such parent custody of his or her child" when affirming the trial court's modification of
custody from the gay father to the mother).
76. Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1, 8 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
77. Id. at 10.
78. Barron v. Barron, 594 A.2d 682 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). See also Constant A., 496
A.2d at 5 (noting that "the presumption of regularity... applies to a heterosexual family").
79. Pascarella v. Pascarella, 512 A.2d 715 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
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evidence that the fact that a child's mother was a lesbian was
harmful to him and that limiting his relationship with his mother
"fails to permit him to confront his life situation, however uncon-
ventional it may be.""
V. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Although underreported by victims and downplayed by the me-
dia, violence and abuse are as troublesome a problem among gay
and lesbian couples as among heterosexual couples.8 In Pennsyl-
vania, a protection from abuse ("PFA") order may be issued "to
bring about a cessation of abuse of the plaintiff 8 2 by "family or
household members, sexual or intimate partners or persons who
share biological parenthood."83 In the case of D.H. v. B.O., the Su-
perior Court held that the petitioner could seek a PFA order
against his former same-sex partner.84 Thus, although Pennsyl-
vania law does not recognize same-sex couples for most purposes,
it does acknowledge that same-sex relationships carry just as
much potential for violence as do heterosexual relationships.
VI. ESTATE PLANNING
Although every family's needs are unique, all same-sex couples
should have a number of core legal documents in place to protect
their families in the event that one of the partners dies. 5
80. Blew v. Verta, 617 A.2d 31, 36 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
81. See generally, Kathleen Finley Duthu, Why Doesn't Anyone Talk About Gay and
Lesbian Domestic Violence? 18 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 23 (1996); Phyllis Goldfarb, Describing
Without Circumscribing: Questioning the Construction of Gender in the Discourse of Inti-
mate Violence, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 582 (1996); Nancy J. Knauer, Same-Sex Domestic
Violence: Claiming a Domestic Sphere While Risking Negative Stereotypes, 8 TEMP. POL. &
Civ. RTS. L. REV. 325 (1999); Ruthann Robson, Lavender Bruises: Intralesbian Violence,
Law and Lesbian Legal Theory, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 567 (1990); Angela West,
Prosecutorial Activism: Confronting Heterosexism in a Lesbian Battering Case, 15 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 249 (1992); Carla M. da Luz, Note, A Legal and Social Comparison of Hetero-
sexual and Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Similar Inadequacies in Legal Recognition and
Response, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 251 (1994); David S. Dupps, Note, Battered
Lesbians: Are They Entitled to a Battered Woman Defense?, 29 J. FAM. L. 879 (1991); Nancy
E. Murphy, Note, Queer Justice: Equal Protection for Victims of Same-Sex Domestic Vio-
lence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 335 (1995).
82. 23 PA. CONS. STAN. ANN. § 2101-14 (West 1975).
83. § 6102(a). "Family or household members" is further defined as, among others,
'current or former sexual or intimate partners." Id.
84. 734 A.2d 409 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
85. See generally, Craig W. Christensen, Legal Ordering of Family Values: The Case of
Gay and Lesbian Families, 18 CARDOzO L. REV. 1299 (1997).
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A. Wills and Trusts
The importance of a well-drafted will to carry out an individ-
ual's wishes upon his or her death cannot be overstated for gay
and lesbian couples. Without a will, inheritance rights are estab-
lished by statutes governing intestate succession," meaning that a
decedent's estate passes to relatives in the precise order set forth
in the statute.87 Although courts have extended inheritance rights
in the absence of a will to those who have entered into a common
law marriage,8" neither the intestate succession statutes nor the
courts have expanded these rights to unmarried domestic part-
ners. Therefore, without a will, the surviving partner may have
no claim to inherit the decedent partner's assets. 9
Children may also be adversely affected if a parent dies intes-
tate. If the couple has not completed a second-parent adoption,
the death of the legally recognized parent could cause the surviv-
ing partner to lose standing to continue as the child's guardian.
Thus, it is crucial for the legally-recognized parent to nominate
the surviving partner as the child's guardian." Conversely, if the
partner who is not legally recognized as a parent dies intestate,
his or her estate will not pass to the children because they have no
legal relationship to the partner.
For some reasons, a "living trust" may be more desirable than a
will for the transfer of assets at death, especially when minor chil-
dren are to be the beneficiaries. These include the desire to keep
the nature and value of the estate private, to retain individual
86. See, e.g., 20 PA. CONS. STAN. ANN. § 6108 (West 2001).
87. § 2102-03. The estate, if there is no surviving spouse, passes to the decedent's next-
of-kin in the following order: issue; parents; brothers, sisters, or their issue; grandparents;
uncles, aunts, and their children and grandchildren; and the Commonwealth. § 2103.
88. See In re Estate of Gower, 284 A.2d 742 (Pa. 1971); In re Stauffer's Estate, 94 A.2d
726 (Pa. 1953).
89. A domestic partnership agreement may act as a will substitute upon the death of
one of the partners. Many domestic partners have entered into some type of agreement
regarding the acquisition of assets and the payment of expenses during their relationship.
Such domestic partnership "agreements" can serve as a backstop for the estate plan and
can also include provisions for how the couple will divide property and conduct themselves
in the unfortunate event of a breakup. Merrianne E. Dean, Estate Planning for Nontradi-
tional Families, 309 PLL/Est 1087 (2001).
90. 20 PA. CONS. STAN. ANN. § 2519 (West 1975) ("A person competent to make a will,
being the sole surviving parent or adopting parent of any unmarried minor child, may
appoint a testamentary guardian of the person of such child during his minority, or for any
shorter period.").
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control of assets, or to provide for more complex control of assets
after death.9'
B. Durable Power of Attorney
A durable power of attorney is a written authorization that can
allow one member of a same-sex couple to appoint his or her part-
ner (or other designated individual) as agent, thereby authorizing
one partner to make business and financial decisions on the other
partner's behalf.92 Unlike a "non-durable" power of attorney, a
durable power of attorney does not terminate when the principal
becomes incapacitated but rather allows the agent to attend to
matters such as withdrawing and receiving the income or corpus
of a trust, engaging in real property transactions, and entering
safe deposit boxes even after the principal's incapacity."
Similarly, a durable power of attorney for health care authorizes
the agent to consent, refuse, or withdraw consent to any medical
care, treatment, or procedure.94 In the event that the principal is
unable to make decisions about his or her own medical care, a
close family member usually assumes the role of substitute deci-
sion maker,95 but gays and lesbians in committed relationships
may prefer that their partner perform this function. However,
because a same-sex partner is not legally recognized as "family"
for these purposes, a partner may be denied the opportunity to
make health care decisions for his or her partner or even to visit in
91. Merrianne E. Dean, Estate Planning for Nontraditional Families, 309 PLI/Est 1087
(2001). Revocable or "living trusts" are used in many states to facilitate transfer of assets
upon death. Basically, the individual transfers all or a substantial portion of his assets to a
trust in which he is the sole or primary beneficiary while reserving the right to amend the
trust or withdraw or add property at any time. Generally, the individual serves as sole
initial trustee. The trust can serve as a will substitute. Upon the individual's death, the
trust can continue, in whole or in part, for the benefit of other designated beneficiaries or
the trust may terminate and the assets distributed to such beneficiaries without the neces-
sity of a succession proceeding. Joel Mender, The Nonprobate Revolution, 50 LA. BAR. 274,
282 (2002).
92. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5604 (West Supp. 2002).
93. § 5602, 04(b).
94. See In re Duran, 769 A.2d 497 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (holding that the appointment
for an emergency guardian to authorized blood transfusions for a patient was improper
because the patient had already named a health care agent in a durable power of attorney
and was not therefore in need of a guardian).
95. In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905, 912 (Pa. 1996). The court explained that family members
are best for this role because they are the most knowledgeable about the patient's prefer-
ences, goals, and values. Id.
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the intensive care unit.96 Using a durable power of attorney for
healthcare can help ensure that all healthcare decisions are made
in accordance with the patient's wishes and in his or her best in-
terest.97
C. Life Insurance
Life insurance can be a means by which gay and lesbian couples
can accomplish a variety of estate planning goals. Life insurance
owned by the beneficiaries or by an irrevocable trust can pay the
estate tax due upon death without using the corpus of the estate
or requiring the sale of real estate or a business.98 It can also pro-
vide income for a surviving partner or child by reducing an es-
tate's assets to avoid probate while still providing a commensurate
amount of money to a chosen beneficiary.99 Importantly, using life
insurance as an estate planning tool greatly increases the likeli-
hood that the amount of a provision for a partner or child can re-
main confidential if so desired.' °
Many insurance companies take the position that unmarried
partners do not have an insurable interest in each other. Thus, an
individual can buy a policy of his or her own life and name a part-
ner as beneficiary, but cannot buy a policy on a partner's life
unless the parties represent that the nature of their relationship
is that of business partners.'0 '
D. Burial Arrangements
Under both Pennsylvania common and statutory law, a surviv-
ing spouse has sole authority over the disposition of the decedent's
remains.0 2 If the decedent is not survived by a spouse, the next of
96. In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (upholding
the appointment as guardian the father of a woman seriously injured in a car accident
rather than her partner. The decision was reversed six years later, 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1992)).
97. Id. at 506 ("When a patient has executed a [durable power of attorney] and named a
personal representative, that choice is given paramount importance.").
98. Matthew R. Dubois, Estate Planning for Gay, Lesbian, and Non-Traditional Elders,
63 ALB. L. REV. 263, 324-27 (1999).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. CURRY, supra note 19, at 2/16. A couple can claim to be business partners if they
own any property together. Id.
102. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 305(b) (West Supp. 2002); Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A.
878, 880 (Pa. 1904).
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kin has this authority.' These rules are based on the presump-
tion that either a spouse or the decedent's family will best under-
stand the decedent's wishes with respect to the disposition of his





If a decedent has left explicit written instructions giving an-
other person control over funeral and burial arrangements, a court
will usually respect those wishes."5 But without written instruc-
tions, the disposition of the body as well as funeral arrangements
may proceed without any input from the decedent's partner. 6 In
Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court sug-
gested that "a more distant relative, or even a friend, not con-
nected by ties of blood, may have a superior right, under excep-
tional circumstances, to one nearer of kin.""0 7 At least one com-
mentator has suggested that this caveat may allow a same-sex
partner to control disposition of a decedent's body in the absence
of specific instructions to that effect, but the "exceptional circum-
stances" standard is rarely applied by the courts.'
CONCLUSION
According to the 2000 Census, nearly 1.2 million residents of the
United States identify themselves as part of a gay or lesbian cou-
ple.10 9 Yet these couples and their families are denied the ap-
proximately 1,200 rights and responsibilities associated with civil
marriage" because state and federal law fail to recognize their
relationships. At present, gay and lesbian couples must take spe-
cial care to ensure that their families are protected as much as
103. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 305(c) (West Supp. 2002).
104. Jennifer E. Horan, Note "When Sleep at Last Has Come": Controlling the Disposi-
tion of Dead Bodies for Same-Sex Couples, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 423,424-25 (1999).
105. See Hodge v. Cameron, 200 A. 238, 241 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1938) ("Unquestionably, the
declarations of the decedent expressing a wish as to burial were admissible, and under
ordinary conditions courts will see to it that the expressed wishes are, as far as it is possi-
ble, carried out.").
106. See generally, Tanya K Hernandez, The Property of Death, 60 U. PITT L. REV. 971
(1999). But see Stewart v. Schwartz Brothers-Jeffer Memorial Chapel, Inc., 606 N.Y.S.2d
965 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (holding that the partner of a man who had died without having
left instructions regarding his funeral could make decisions rather than the decedent's
family because of their "spouse-like relationship.").
107. Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878, 880 (Pa. 1904) (noting that the decedent's wishes
should be entitled to "respectful consideration").
108. Horan, supra note 104, at 429.
109. Bennett & Milko, supra note 22, at 29.
110. Defense of Marriage Act, Letter Report, GAO/OGC-97-16 (Jan. 31, 1997), available
at http'J/www.gao.gov.
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possible, but as society continues to refine its notions of what con-
stitutes a family-and as couples continue to challenge the laws
themselves in courts and in the legislatures-issues concerning
same-sex couples and their children will no doubt move to the
forefront of family law as same-sex couples continue to search for
their "pot of gold."
